Authors
Travis Timmerman
Seton Hall University
Abstract
According to actualism, an agent ought to φ just in case what would happen if she were to φ is better than what would happen if she were to ~φ. We argue that actualism makes a morally irrelevant distinction between certain counterfactuals, given that an agent sometimes has the same kind of control over their truth-value. We then offer a substantive revision to actualism that avoids this morally irrelevant distinction by focusing on a certain kind of control that is available to an agent. Finally, we show how this revised view has two additional advantages over actualism.
Keywords Actualism  Possibilism
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.26556/jesp.v10i3.104
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 59,107
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Oughts, Options, and Actualism.Frank Jackson & Robert Pargetter - 1986 - Philosophical Review 95 (2):233-255.
Consequence and Contrast in Deontic Semantics.Fabrizio Cariani - 2016 - Journal of Philosophy 113 (8):396-416.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Opting for the Best: Oughts and Options.Douglas W. Portmore - 2019 - New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press.
Consequentialism and Nonhuman Animals.Tyler John & Jeff Sebo - forthcoming - In Douglas W. Portmore (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Consequentialism. New York, USA: Oxford University Press. pp. 564-591.
Actualism and Possibilism in Ethics.Travis Timmerman & Yishai Cohen - 2019 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
How to Be an Actualist and Blame People.Travis Timmerman & Philip Swenson - 2019 - Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility 6.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Moral Obligations: Actualist, Possibilist, or Hybridist?Travis Timmerman & Yishai Cohen - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (4):672-686.
Actualism, Possibilism, and Beyond.Jacob Ross - 2012 - Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics.
What's Wrong with Possibilism.C. Woodard - 2009 - Analysis 69 (2):219-226.
Objective Consequentialism and Avoidable Imperfections.Rob van Someren Greve - 2013 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (3):481-492.
No Problem for Actualism.Michael Losonsky - 1986 - Philosophical Review 95 (1):95-97.
In Defense of the Contingently Nonconcrete.Bernard Linsky & Edward N. Zalta - 1996 - Philosophical Studies 84 (2-3):283-294.
S5 for Aristotelian Actualists.Benjamin Mitchell-Yellin & Michael Nelson - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (6):1537-1569.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2016-10-26

Total views
177 ( #55,970 of 2,428,005 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
11 ( #61,405 of 2,428,005 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes