Actualism Has Control Issues

Abstract
According to actualism, an agent ought to φ just in case what would happen if she were to φ is better than what would happen if she were to ~φ. We argue that actualism makes a morally irrelevant distinction between certain counterfactuals, given that an agent sometimes has the same kind of control over their truth-value. We then offer a substantive revision to actualism that avoids this morally irrelevant distinction by focusing on a certain kind of control that is available to an agent. Finally, we show how this revised view has two additional advantages over actualism.
Keywords Actualism  Possibilism
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References found in this work BETA
Consequence and Contrast in Deontic Semantics.Fabrizio Cariani - 2016 - Journal of Philosophy 113 (8):396-416.
Oughts, Options, and Actualism.Frank Jackson & Robert Pargetter - 1986 - Philosophical Review 95 (2):233-255.
Moral Obligations: Actualist, Possibilist, or Hybridist?Travis Timmerman & Yishai Cohen - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (4):672-686.
Perform Your Best Option.Douglas W. Portmore - 2013 - Journal of Philosophy 110 (8):436-459.

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Citations of this work BETA
Opting for the Best: Oughts and Options.Douglas W. Portmore - forthcoming - New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press.

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