Abstract
Professor Goodman first presented his "new riddle of induction" in 1946 but it was mainly the more elaborated version published in his Fact, Fiction and Forecast in 1955 that has captured the attention of philosophers. Since then, numerous attempts to solve his "paradox of grue" appeared in press; none of them, however, proved to be wholly satisfactory. In this paper I want to present a solution to this 30-years old puzzle. In the first section I shall try to show that my solution, which is based on a Gedankenexperiment, is immune to the objections leveled against previous attempts. In light of this solution I shall re-examine the status of the paradox and show that in order to preserve the meaningfulness of the paradox some type of Platonic framework for the theory of meaning should have to be assumed. In the last section I shall discuss a proposed solution to the paradox using counterfactual claims. I will show that despite the similarity between counterfactuals and thought-experiments, the counterfactual approach does not lead to a satisfactory solution