Bootstrapping, defeasible reasoning, and a priori justification

Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):141-159 (2010)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This article has no associated abstract. (fix it)

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,386

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Experientially defeasible a priori justification.Joshua Thurow - 2006 - Philosophical Quarterly 56 (225):596–602.
The problem of defeasible justification.Michael Huemer - 2001 - Erkenntnis 54 (3):375-397.
Self-defeating arguments.John L. Pollock - 1991 - Minds and Machines 1 (4):367-392.
``Defeasible Reasoning with Variable Degrees of Justification".John L. Pollock - 2001 - Artificial Intelligence 133 (1-2):233-282.
The epistemic basis of defeasible reasoning.Robert L. Causey - 1991 - Minds and Machines 1 (4):437-458.
Defeasible reasoning and logic programming.Timothy R. Colburn - 1991 - Minds and Machines 1 (4):417-436.
Defeasible a priori justification: A reply to Thurow.Albert Casullo - 2008 - Philosophical Quarterly 58 (231):336–343.

Analytics

Added to PP
2010-12-30

Downloads
355 (#54,632)

6 months
16 (#149,885)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

Extended Rationality: A Hinge Epistemology.Annalisa Coliva - 2015 - London, England: Palgrave-Macmillan.
The a priority of abduction.Stephen Biggs & Jessica M. Wilson - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (3):735-758.
The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Methodology.Herman Cappelen, Tamar Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.) - 2016 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.
Entitlement: The Basis for Empirical Epistemic Warrant.Tyler Burge - 2020 - In Peter Graham & Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen (eds.), Epistemic Entitlement. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 37-142.
Problems for Credulism.James Pryor - 2013 - In Chris Tucker (ed.), Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism. New York: Oxford University Press USA. pp. 89–131.

View all 50 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Knowledge and its limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Skepticism and the Veil of Perception.Michael Huemer (ed.) - 2001 - Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.
The skeptic and the dogmatist.James Pryor - 2000 - Noûs 34 (4):517–549.

View all 29 references / Add more references