Basic knowledge and the problem of easy knowledge

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2):309-329 (2002)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The dominant response to this problem of the criterion focuses on the alleged requirement that we need to know a belief source is reliable in order for us to acquire knowledge by that source. Let us call this requirement, “The KR principle”

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 97,060

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Why Basic Knowledge is Easy Knowledge.Stewart Cohen - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):417-430.
Easy knowledge.Peter J. Markie - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):406–416.
A contextualist solution to the problem of easy knowledge.Ram Neta - 2005 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 69 (1):183-206.
Solving the problem of easy knowledge.Tim Black - 2008 - Philosophical Quarterly 58 (233):597-617.
Later Wittgenstein and the Problem of Easy Knowledge.Scott Scheall - 2010 - Philosophical Investigations 34 (3):268-286.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
799 (#23,868)

6 months
45 (#108,642)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

Reflection and disagreement.Adam Elga - 2007 - Noûs 41 (3):478–502.
Reliabilist Epistemology.Alvin Goldman & Bob Beddor - 2021 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Epistemic Akrasia.Sophie Horowitz - 2013 - Noûs 48 (4):718-744.

View all 232 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Philosophical explanations.Robert Nozick - 1981 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
The structure of empirical knowledge.Laurence BonJour - 1985 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Epistemology and cognition.Alvin I. Goldman - 1986 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
A virtue epistemology.Ernest Sosa - 2007 - New York: Oxford University Press.

View all 24 references / Add more references