Colour constancy as counterfactual

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (1):61 – 92 (2008)
Abstract
There is nothing in this World constant but Inconstancy. [Swift 1711: 258] In this paper I argue that two standard characterizations of colour constancy are inadequate to the phenomenon. This inadequacy matters, since, I contend, philosophical appeals to colour constancy as a way of motivating illumination-independent conceptions of colour turn crucially on the shortcomings of these characterizations. After critically reviewing the standard characterizations, I provide a novel counterfactualist understanding of colour constancy, argue that it avoids difficulties of its traditional rivals, and defend it from objections. Finally, I show why, on this improved understanding, colour constancy does not have the philosophical consequences that have been claimed for it in the literature
Keywords color   perception   constancy
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DOI 10.1080/00048400701846566
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References found in this work BETA
Action in Perception.Alva Noë - 2005 - MIT Press.
Color Realism and Color Science.Alex Byrne & David R. Hilbert - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):3-21.
Dispositions and Conditionals.C. B. Martin - 1994 - Philosophical Quarterly 44 (174):1-8.

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Citations of this work BETA
Information as a Probabilistic Difference Maker.Andrea Scarantino - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (3):419-443.
Husserl on Perceptual Constancy.Michael Madary - 2012 - European Journal of Philosophy 20 (1):145-165.
Are Color Experiences Representational?Todd Ganson - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (1):1-20.
Colour Layering and Colour Relationalism.Derek H. Brown - 2015 - Minds and Machines 25 (2):177-191.

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