Consciousness cannot be separated from function

Trends in Cognitive Sciences 15 (8):358--364 (2011)
Authors
Daniel C. Dennett
Tufts University
Abstract
Here, we argue that any neurobiological theory based on an experience/function division cannot be empirically confirmed or falsified and is thus outside the scope of science. A ‘perfect experiment’ illustrates this point, highlighting the unbreachable boundaries of the scientific study of consciousness. We describe a more nuanced notion of cognitive access that captures personal experience without positing the existence of inaccessible conscious states. Finally, we discuss the criteria necessary for forming and testing a falsifiable theory of consciousness
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DOI 10.1016/j.tics.2011.06.008
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References found in this work BETA

What is It Like to Be a Bat?Thomas Nagel - 1974 - Philosophical Review 83 (October):435-50.
On a Confusion About a Function of Consciousness.Ned Block - 1995 - Brain and Behavioral Sciences 18 (2):227-–247.
A Sensorimotor Account of Vision and Visual Consciousness.J. Kevin O'Regan & Alva Noë - 2001 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (5):883-917.

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Citations of this work BETA

Perceptual Consciousness Overflows Cognitive Access.Ned Block - 2011 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 15 (12):567-575.
Rich Conscious Perception Outside Focal Attention.Ned Block - 2014 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 18 (9):445-447.

View all 38 citations / Add more citations

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