Contextualist solutions to epistemological problems: Scepticism, Gettier, and the lottery

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (2):289 – 306 (1998)
Abstract
(1998). Contextualist solutions to epistemological problems: Scepticism, Gettier, and the lottery. Australasian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 76, No. 2, pp. 289-306. doi: 10.1080/00048409812348411
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DOI 10.1080/00048409812348411
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References found in this work BETA

Elusive Knowledge.David Lewis - 1996 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (4):549 – 567.
Solving the Skeptical Problem.Keith DeRose - 1995 - Philosophical Review 104 (1):1-52.
Theory of Knowledge.Roderick M. Chisholm - 1966 - Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall.
Scorekeeping in a Language Game.David Lewis - 1979 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 8 (1):339--359.
How to Be a Fallibilist.Stewart Cohen - 1988 - Philosophical Perspectives 2:91-123.

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Citations of this work BETA

On Pragmatic Encroachment in Epistemology.Matthew McGrath - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (3):558-589.
Knowledge Isn't Closed on Saturday: A Study in Ordinary Language.Wesley Buckwalter - 2010 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (3):395-406.
The Ontology of Epistemic Reasons.John Turri - 2009 - Noûs 43 (3):490-512.
Contextualism and Warranted Assertibility Manoeuvres.Jessica Brown - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 130 (3):407 - 435.
A Defense of Stable Invariantism.Baron Reed - 2010 - Noûs 44 (2):224-244.

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