Color, variation, and the appeal to essences: Impasse and resolution

Philosophical Studies 133 (3):425-438 (2006)
Many philosophers have been attracted by the view that colors are mind- independent properties of object surfaces. A leading, and increasingly popular, version of this view that has been defended in recent years is the so-called physicalist position that identi?es colors with (classes of) spectral re?ectance distributions.1 This view, has, however, come in for a fair bit of criticism for failing to do justice to the facts about perceptual variation.2
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-007-9076-1
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