Dependent relationships and the moral standing of nonhuman animals

Ethics and the Environment 13 (2):pp. 1-21 (2008)
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Abstract

This essay explores whether dependent relationships might justify extending direct moral consideration to nonhuman animals. After setting out a formal conception of moral standing as relational, scalar, and unilateral, I consider whether and how an appeal to dependencies might be the basis for an animal’s moral standing. If dependencies generate reasons for extending direct moral consideration, such reasons will admit of significant variations in scope and stringency.

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2009-01-28

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Andrew I. Cohen
Georgia State University

Citations of this work

On the Idea of Degrees of Moral Status.Dick Timmer - forthcoming - Journal of Value Inquiry:1-19.
Contractarianism and Interspecies Welfare Conflicts.Andrew I. Cohen - 2009 - Social Philosophy and Policy 26 (1):227-257.

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References found in this work

The case for animal rights.Tom Regan - 2009 - In Steven M. Cahn (ed.), Exploring ethics: an introductory anthology. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 425-434.
Liberalism, Community, and Culture.Will Kymlicka - 1989 - Oxford University Press.

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