Evaluating arguments and making meta-arguments

Informal Logic 21 (2) (2001)

Daniel Cohen
Colby College
This paper explores the outlines of a framework for evaluating arguments. Among the factors to take into account are the strength of the arguers' inferences, the level of their engagement with objections raised by other interlocutors, and their effectiveness in rationally persuading their target audiences. Some connections among these can be understood only in the context of meta-argumentation and meta-rationality. The Principle of Meta-Rationality (PMR)--that reasoning rationally includes reasoning about rationality-is used to explain why it can be rational to resist dialectically satisfying arguments or accept logically flawed ones
Keywords argument, rationality, logic, rhetoric, dialectic
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Two Concepts of Argument.Daniel J. O'Keefe - 1992 - In William L. Benoit, Dale Hample & Pamela J. Benoit (eds.), Readings in Argumentation. Foris Publications. pp. 11--79.
[Letter From Gilbert Ryle].Gilbert Ryle - 1932 - Philosophy 7 (26):250 -.
What The Tortoise Said To Achilles.Lewis Carroll - 1895 - Mind 104 (416):691-693.

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