Finking Frankfurt

Philosophical Studies 135 (3):363--74 (2007)
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Abstract

Michael Smith has resisted Harry Frankfurt's claim that moral responsibility does not require the ability to have done otherwise. He does this by claiming that, in Frankfurt cases, the ability to do otherwise is indeed present, but is a disposition that has been `finked' or masked by other factors. We suggest that, while Smith's account appears to work for some classic Frankfurt cases, it does not work for all. In particular, Smith cannot explain cases, such as the Willing Addict, where the Frankfurt devise - e.g. the addiction - is intrinsic to the agent.

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Author Profiles

Daniel B Cohen
Charles Sturt University
Toby Handfield
Monash University

Citations of this work

Masked Abilities and Compatibilism.M. Fara - 2008 - Mind 117 (468):843-865.
Opposing powers.Randolph Clarke - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 149 (2):153 - 160.
Intrinsic finks.Randolph Clarke - 2008 - Philosophical Quarterly 58 (232):512–518.

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References found in this work

Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1969 - Journal of Philosophy 66 (23):829-839.
Freedom of the will and the concept of a person.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (1):5-20.
Freedom Within Reason.Susan R. Wolf - 1990 - New York: Oup Usa.
Freedom of the will and the concept of a person.Harry Frankfurt - 2004 - In Tim Crane & Katalin Farkas (eds.), Metaphysics: a guide and anthology. New York: Oxford University Press.
Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person.Harry Frankfurt - 1982 - In Gary Watson (ed.), Free will. New York: Oxford University Press.

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