Hume's Moral Sentiments As Motives

Hume Studies 36 (2):193-213 (2010)
Abstract
There is considerable evidence that Hume thinks the moral sentiments move us to action, at least in some circumstances. For one thing, he relies on the premise that moral evaluations move us to action to argue that moral evaluations are not derived from reason alone, in his most famous anti-rationalist argument. Presumably, this capacity of moral evaluations can be explained by the fact that such evaluations are, or are the product of, moral sentiments. But this raises three interconnected interpretive questions. First, on Hume's account, much virtuous behavior is traceable to motives other than the sentiments of approval and disapproval; so when and how do the moral.
Keywords History of Philosophy  Major Philosophers
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ISBN(s) 0319-7336
DOI 10.1353/hms.2010.0024
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