Intuition, Induction, and the Middle Way

The Monist 65 (3):287-301 (1982)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The tapestry of Wilfrid Sellars’s writings is dauntingly rich in stimulus and suggestion. I shall take up here an intriguing strand of thought that was woven into one of his early papers ‘Language, Rules and Behavior’, and I shall discuss some of the issues to which it gives rise. Sellars was concerned in that paper with the procedures by which people evaluate actions as right or wrong, arguments as valid or invalid, and cognitive claims as well or ill grounded. He sought to map out a true vïa media, in his treatment of such procedures, between rationalistic apriorism and what, for want of a better term then, he called ‘descriptivism’, by which he understood the claim that all meaningful concepts and problems belong to the empirical or descriptive sciences, including the sciences of human behaviour. Sellars was thus led to ask not only ‘What sort of a thing is justification?’ but also ‘How do we come to accept the rules or laws that license justifications?’ And he saw these questions as arising in relation to any dialogue in which one party seeks to justify something to another. With regard to the justification of actions he held that the intuitionism of Ross, Prichard and Ewing was reasonably faithful to the phenomenology of moral thought and experience, though he did not agree with their belief in a nonnatural quality or relation that may belong to actions over and above their empirical characteristics. With regard to the justification of predictions he held that the relevant covering laws are ultimately rendered acceptable by an appeal to instances of their application. But he was reluctant to conceive this kind of appeal as an inductive procedure. Instead he called it an application of Socratic method, since the purpose of this method is to make explicit the rules that we have implicitly adopted for thought and action, and Sellars interpreted our judgments to the effect that A causally necessitates B as the expression of a rule governing our use of the terms ‘A’ and ‘B’: science consists in the attempt, by remodeling human language, to develop a system of rule-governed behaviour which will adjust the human organism to the environment.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,202

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Intuition Mongering.Moti Mizrahi - 2012 - The Reasoner 6 (11):169-170.
Induction et intuition.Alf Nyman - 1953 - Theoria 19 (1-2):21-41.
Intuition, consistency, and the excluded middle.Ernest Nagel - 1929 - Journal of Philosophy 26 (18):477-489.
More Intuition Mongering.Moti Mizrahi - 2013 - The Reasoner 7 (1):5-6.
The place of induction in science.Mario Bunge - 1960 - Philosophy of Science 27 (3):262-270.
Understanding induction.John Macnamara - 1991 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 42 (1):21-48.
Rational intuition: Bealer on its nature and epistemic status.Ernest Sosa - 1996 - Philosophical Studies 81 (2-3):151--162.

Analytics

Added to PP
2011-02-21

Downloads
104 (#162,687)

6 months
7 (#350,235)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

Can human irrationality be experimentally demonstrated?L. Jonathan Cohen - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):317-370.
Are there any a priori constraints on the study of rationality?L. Jonathan Cohen - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):359-370.
L. J. Cohen versus Bayesianism.Ilkka Niiniluoto - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):349-349.
Improvements in human reasoning and an error in L. J. Cohen's.David H. Krantz - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):340-340.
Should Bayesians sometimes neglect base rates?Isaac Levi - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):342-343.

View all 32 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references