Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 5 (2):89-98 (2016)
| Abstract |
The new dispositionalists defend the position that an agent in a deterministic Frankfurt-style case has the ability to do otherwise, where that ability is the one at issue in the principle of alternative possibilities. Focusing specifically on Kadri Vihvelin's proposal, I argue against this position by showing that it is incompatible with the existence of structurally similar cases to FSCs in which a preemptive intervener bestows an agent with an ability.
|
| Keywords | determinism Frankfurt‐style cases principle of alternative possibilities compatibilism moral responsibility |
| Categories | (categorize this paper) |
| DOI | 10.1002/tht3.198 |
| Options |
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Request removal from index
|
Download options
References found in this work BETA
Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1969 - Journal of Philosophy 66 (23):829.
Free Will Demystified: A Dispositional Account.Kadri Vihvelin - 2004 - Philosophical Topics 32 (1/2):427-450.
Libertarianism and Frankfurt's Attack on the Principle of Alternative Possibilities.David Widerker - 1995 - Philosophical Review 104 (2):247-61.
View all 26 references / Add more references
Citations of this work BETA
A Problem for Frankfurt Examples.Samuel J. M. Kahn - 2021 - Southwest Philosophy Review 37 (1):159-167.
Similar books and articles
A Challenge for Frankfurt-Style Compatibilists.Philip Swenson - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (5):1279-1285.
Neo-Frankfurtians and Buffer Cases: The New Challenge to the Principle of Alternative Possibilities.Christopher Evan Franklin - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 152 (2):189–207.
The Principle of Avoidable Blame.Gerald K. Harrison - 2004 - [email protected] - An International Journal for Moral Philosophy 3 (1):37-46.
The Manipulation Argument, At the Very Least, Undermines Classical Compatibilism.Yishai Cohen - 2015 - Philosophia 43 (2):291-307.
Countering Cova: Frankfurt-Style Cases Are Still Broken.Neil Levy - 2014 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (3):523-527.
Actions, Thought-Experiments and the 'Principle of Alternate Possibilities'.Maria Alvarez - 2009 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (1):61 – 81.
Moral Responsibility and the Principle of Avoidable Blame.Gerald K. Harrison - 2004 - [email protected] - An International Journal for Moral Philosophy 3 (1):37-46.
Frankfurt-Style Cases User Manual: Why Frankfurt-Style Enabling Cases Do Not Necessitate Tech Support.Florian Cova - 2014 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (3):505-521.
The (Near) Necessity of Alternate Possibilities for Moral Responsibility.Richard M. Glatz - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 139 (2):257-272.
The Impertinence of Frankfurt-Style Argument.Daniel James Speak - 2007 - Philosophical Quarterly 57 (226):76-95.
Moral Responsibility, Determinism, and the Ability to Do Otherwise.Peter Van Inwagen - 1999 - The Journal of Ethics 3 (4):343-351.
The Importance of Frankfurt-Style Argument.John Martin Fischer - 2007 - Philosophical Quarterly 57 (228):464–471.
The Limits of Limited-Blockage Frankfurt-Style Cases.Michael Robinson - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (3):429-446.
Analytics
Added to PP index
2016-02-17
Total views
200 ( #54,175 of 2,462,366 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
10 ( #70,875 of 2,462,366 )
2016-02-17
Total views
200 ( #54,175 of 2,462,366 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
10 ( #70,875 of 2,462,366 )
How can I increase my downloads?
Downloads
