In Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District, the Supreme Court set an exacting standard for establishing institutional liability under Title IX for a teacher sexually harassing a student. That standard, rejecting the simple application of agency principles and instead requiring a student to notify the school of the harassment and then the school to be deliberately indifferent to the student's complaints, has been inconsistently applied by lower courts faced with other, non-harassment forms of sex discrimination under Title IX. In other areas of the law, the Supreme Court has regularly applied well-established federal common-law agency principles to statutes when determining liability issues. This Article argues that, when faced with Title IX non-harassment claims, courts should do the same because the policy reasons that offer the only reasonable explanation of the result in Gebser are not present in cases of non-harassment sex discrimination in schools and because non-harassment sex discrimination lies at the heart of Title IX's prohibition of sex discrimination in federally funded educational institutions.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 64,037
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles


Added to PP index

Total views
19 ( #564,111 of 2,454,408 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #449,346 of 2,454,408 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes