Moral Realism and Faultless Disagreement

Ratio 29 (2):202-212 (2015)
  Copy   BIBTEX


Is moral realism compatible with the existence of moral disagreements? Since moral realism requires that if two persons are in disagreement over some moral question at least one must be objectively mistaken, it seems difficult to uphold that there can be moral disagreements without fault. Alison Hills argued that moral realism can accommodate such disagreements. Her strategy is to argue that moral reasoners can be faultless in making an objectively false moral judgement if they followed the relevant epistemic norm, i.e. follow your conscience, when making their judgement. I will argue that Hills' strategy does not work. The putative epistemic norm follow your conscience does not trump moral truth, because believing something wrong for the wrong reasons is worse than believing something right for the wrong reasons.



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 83,944

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Faultless Moral Disagreement.Alison Hills - 2013 - Ratio 26 (4):410-427.
Defending Moral Realism from Empirical Evidence of Disagreement.C. D. Meyers - 2013 - Social Theory and Practice 39 (3):373-396.
Disagreement: Ethics and Elsewhere.Folke Tersman - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (S1):55-72.
Moral Realism: Discovering Right and Wrong.Alice Perrin - 1988 - Dissertation, University of Miami
An Alternative to Relativism.John K. Davis - 2010 - Philosophical Topics 38 (2):17-37.
The moral significance of moral realism.Torbjörn Tännsjö - 1988 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 26 (2):247-261.
Morality, Meaning and Realism.Douglas Joel Butler - 1988 - Dissertation, University of Pittsburgh
Outline for an Argument for Moral Realism.Lars Bergström - 1981 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 12 (1):215-225.
Facts, Values and Moral Realism.David Schejbal - 1991 - Dissertation, The University of Connecticut
Making Sense of Explanatory Objections to Moral Realism.Elizabeth Tropman - 2013 - American Philosophical Quarterly 50 (1):37-50.


Added to PP

154 (#96,601)

6 months
1 (#505,949)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Daniel Cohnitz
Utrecht University

Citations of this work

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references