Moral Reasons, Moral Action, and Rationality

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 12 (3):557 - 577 (1982)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

I want to examine a relationship between rationality and moral behavior. To do this, I shall first set out some basic intuitions. Then, within that framework I shall raise a problem about the relationship between rationality and moral behavior; in particular, I shall suggest that present in these basic intuitions is an inconsistency which can be remedied only by a radical alteration of one intuition.It is rational to perform a morally right action. The sense of this claim is fairly clear, but the claim itself needs further articulation. For example, it is rational to conclude that the sum of 37 and 22 is 59, but the conclusion has not been reached rationally if the way in which one hit on 59 as the answer was to pluck a pea - luckily enough, number 59 - from the bingo basket. In speaking about a belief or an action being rational, reference must be made to an agent, to reasons, and to the agent's reasons.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,069

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Craving the Right: Emotions and Moral Reasons.Patricia Greenspan - 2011 - In Carla Bagnoli (ed.), Morality and the Emotions. Oxford University Press. pp. 39.
Practical Reasons and Moral 'Ought'.Patricia Greenspan - 2007 - In Russell Schafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, vol. II. Clarendon Press. pp. 172-194.
Reasoning with moral conflicts.John F. Horty - 2003 - Noûs 37 (4):557–605.
Moral testimony and its authority.Philip Nickel - 2001 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 4 (3):253-266.
The Weight of Moral Reasons.Ralph Wedgwood - 2013 - Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics (Ed. Mark Timmons) 3:35-58.
Does Rationality Consist in Responding Correctly to Reasons?John Broome - 2007 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 4 (3):349-374.

Analytics

Added to PP
2011-05-29

Downloads
37 (#382,565)

6 months
2 (#725,330)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references