Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):25-26 (2003)

Authors
Jonathan Cohen
University of California, San Diego
Abstract
In many cases of variation in color vision, there is no non-arbitrary way of choosing between variants. Byrne and Hilbert insist that there is an unknown standard for choosing, while eliminativists claim that all the variants are erroneous. A better response relativizes colors to perceivers, thereby providing a color realism that avoids the need to choose between variants
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DOI 10.1017/s0140525x03260015
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References found in this work BETA

On a Confusion About a Function of Consciousness.Ned Block - 1995 - Brain and Behavioral Sciences 18 (2):227-–247.
Consciousness Explained.William G. Lycan - 1993 - Philosophical Review 102 (3):424.
The Varieties of Reference.Louise M. Antony - 1987 - Philosophical Review 96 (2):275.

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Citations of this work BETA

Color Objectivism and Color Pluralism.Vivian Mizrahi - 2006 - Dialectica 60 (3):283-306.
A Realistic Colour Realism.Joshua Gert - 2006 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (4):565 – 589.
Why Don’T Synaesthetic Colours Adapt Away?Dave Ward - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 159 (1):123-138.

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