Perceptual variation, realism, and relativization, or: How I learned to stop worrying and love variations in color vision

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):25-26 (2003)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In many cases of variation in color vision, there is no non-arbitrary way of choosing between variants. Byrne and Hilbert insist that there is an unknown standard for choosing, while eliminativists claim that all the variants are erroneous. A better response relativizes colors to perceivers, thereby providing a color realism that avoids the need to choose between variants

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,931

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
120 (#153,285)

6 months
14 (#201,098)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Jonathan Cohen
University of California, San Diego

References found in this work

Ontological relativity and other essays.Willard Van Orman Quine (ed.) - 1969 - New York: Columbia University Press.
On a confusion about a function of consciousness.Ned Block - 1995 - Brain and Behavioral Sciences 18 (2):227-–247.
Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 1980 - Critica 17 (49):69-71.
The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception.Marc H. Bornstein - 1980 - Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 39 (2):203-206.

View all 103 references / Add more references