In Julien Dutant & Fabian Dorsch (eds.), The New Evil Demon. Oxford University Press (forthcoming)

Authors
Juan Comesaña
University of Arizona
Abstract
The traditional view in epistemology is that we must distinguish between being rational and being right (that is also, by the way, the traditional view about practical rationality). In his paper in this volume, Williamson proposes an alternative view according to which only beliefs that amount to knowledge are rational (and, thus, no false belief is rational). It is healthy to challenge tradition, in philosophy as much as elsewhere. But, in this instance, we think that tradition has it right. In this paper we defend our version of the traditional view and argue against Williamson’s alternative.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Buy the book Find it on Amazon.com
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.
Knowledge and Action.John Hawthorne & Jason Stanley - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (10):571-590.

View all 15 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Evidence and Bias.Nick Hughes - forthcoming - In Clayton Littlejohn & Maria Lasonen Aarnio (eds.), Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence.
Blame and Wrongdoing.Jessica Brown - 2017 - Episteme 14 (3):275-296.
Epistemology Without Guidance.Nick Hughes - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP index
2018-12-28

Total views
209 ( #45,755 of 2,426,356 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
32 ( #25,712 of 2,426,356 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes