Erkenntnis 86 (6):1547-1565 (2021)

Michael Cohen
Stanford University
According to one form of epistemic contrastivism, due to Jonathan Schaffer, knowledge is not a binary relation between an agent and a proposition, but a ternary relation between an agent, a proposition, and a context-basing question. In a slogan: to know is to know the answer to a question. I argue, first, that Schaffer-style epistemic contrastivism can be semantically represented in inquisitive dynamic epistemic logic, a recent implementation of inquisitive semantics in the framework of dynamic epistemic logic; second, that within inquisitive dynamic epistemic logic, the contrastive ternary knowledge operator is reducible to the standard binary one. The reduction shows, I argue, that Schaffer’s argument in favor of contrastivism is compatible with a binary picture of knowledge. This undercuts the force of the argument in favor of contrastivism.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s10670-019-00169-4
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Translate to english
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 63,360
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

From Contextualism to Contrastivism.Jonathan Schaffer - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 119 (1-2):73-104.
Contrastive Statements.Fred I. Dretske - 1972 - Philosophical Review 81 (4):411-437.

View all 13 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

The Knowledge Relation: Binary or Ternary? Ren - 2008 - Social Epistemology 22 (3):281 – 288.
The Knowledge Relation: Binary or Ternary?Rene van Woudenberg - 2008 - Social Epistemology 22 (3):281-288.
Solving the Problem of Nearly Convergent Knowledge.Chris Tweedt - 2018 - Social Epistemology 32 (4):219-227.
A Counterexample to the Contrastive Account of Knowledge.Jason Rourke - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (3):637-643.
Contrastive Knowledge: Reply to Baumann.Jonathan Schaffer - 2012 - In Stefan Tolksdorf (ed.), The Concept of Knowledge. Walter de Gruyter. pp. 411-24.
Contrastive Knowledge.Adam Morton - 2012 - In Martijn Blaauw (ed.), Contrastivism in Philosophy. New York: Routledge. pp. 101-115.
Kontrastywizm epistemiczny.Rafał Palczewski - 2009 - Filozofia Nauki 17 (4).
From Contextualism to Contrastivism.Jonathan Schaffer - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 119 (1-2):73-104.
Epistemic Contrastivism.Peter Baumann - 2017 - Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy.


Added to PP index

Total views
24 ( #454,049 of 63,346 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
2 ( #300,727 of 63,346 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes