Mind 119 (476):907 - 932 (2010)

Authors
Daniel B Cohen
Charles Sturt University
Abstract
In this paper we present an account of practical rationality and weakness of will in terms of rational capacities. We show how our account rectifies various shortcomings in Michael Smith's related theory. In particular, our account is capable of accommodating cases of weak-willed behaviour that are not `akratic', or otherwise contrary to the agent's better judgement. Our account differs from Smith's primarily by incorporating resolve: a third rational capacity for resolute maintenance of one's intentions. We discuss further two ways to explain the importance of resolve to practical rationality: one based on Richard Holton's recent work, and an alternative, non-consequentialist account.
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References found in this work BETA

Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason.Michael Bratman - 1987 - Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Masked Abilities and Compatibilism.M. Fara - 2008 - Mind 117 (468):843-865.
Powers.George Molnar - 2003 - Oxford University Press.
Intention and Weakness of Will.Richard Holton - 1999 - Journal of Philosophy 96 (5):241.

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Citations of this work BETA

What in the World is Weakness of Will?Joshua May & Richard Holton - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 157 (3):341–360.
Could Integrity Be An Epistemic Virtue?Greg Scherkoske - 2012 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 20 (2):185-215.
Reconsidering Resolutions.Alida Liberman - 2016 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy (2):1-27.
Bibliography.Richard Holton - 2000 - Philosophical Inquiry 22 (4):112-112.

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Rational Resolve.Richard Holton - 2004 - Philosophical Review 113 (4):507-535.
Rational Capacities.Michael Smith - 2003 - In Sarah Stroud & Christine Tappolet (eds.), Weakness of Will and Varities of Practical Irrationality. Oxford University Press. pp. 17-38.
Skepticism About Weakness of Will.Gary Watson - 1977 - Philosophical Review 86 (3):316-339.

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