Mind 119 (476):907 - 932 (2010)
AbstractIn this paper we present an account of practical rationality and weakness of will in terms of rational capacities. We show how our account rectifies various shortcomings in Michael Smith's related theory. In particular, our account is capable of accommodating cases of weak-willed behaviour that are not `akratic', or otherwise contrary to the agent's better judgement. Our account differs from Smith's primarily by incorporating resolve: a third rational capacity for resolute maintenance of one's intentions. We discuss further two ways to explain the importance of resolve to practical rationality: one based on Richard Holton's recent work, and an alternative, non-consequentialist account.
Similar books and articles
Weakness of will and rational action.Robert Audi - 1990 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 68 (3):270 – 281.
Weakness of will as intention-violation.Dylan Dodd - 2009 - European Journal of Philosophy 17 (1):45-59.
Weakness of Will, the Background, and Chinese Thought.Chris Fraser - 2008 - In Searle’s Philosophy and Chinese Philosophy. pp. 313–33.
Weakness of will, the background, and chinese thought.Kai-Yee Wong & Chris Fraser - 2008 - In Bo Mou (ed.), Searle’s Philosophy and Chinese Philosophy: Constructive Engagemen. Leiden: Brill Academic Publishers. pp. 313-333.
Rational Capacities.Michael Smith - 2003 - In Sarah Stroud & Christine Tappolet (eds.), Weakness of Will and Practical Irrationality. Oxford University Press. pp. 17-38.
Rational Capacities, or: How to Distinguish Recklessness, Weakness, and Compulsion.Michael Smith - 2003 - In Sarah Stroud & Christine Tappolet (eds.), Weakness of Will and Practical Irrationality. Oxford: Clarendon Press. pp. 17-38.
Added to PP
Historical graph of downloads
Citations of this work
What in the World is Weakness of Will?Joshua May & Richard Holton - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 157 (3):341–360.
Situationism, capacities and culpability.Adam Piovarchy - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (6):1997-2027.
Non-psychological weakness of will: self-control, stereotypes, and consequences.Mathieu Doucet & John Turri - 2014 - Synthese 191 (16):3935-3954.
Could Integrity Be An Epistemic Virtue?Greg Scherkoske - 2012 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 20 (2):185-215.
References found in this work
Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason.Michael Bratman - 1987 - Cambridge: Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility.John Martin Fischer & Mark Ravizza - 1998 - Cambridge University Press.
Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility.John Martin Fischer & Mark Ravizza - 1999 - Philosophical Quarterly 49 (197):543-545.