Suppositional Reasoning and Perceptual Justification

Logos and Episteme 7 (2):215-219 (2016)
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Abstract

James Van Cleve raises some objections to my attempt to solve the bootstrapping problem for what I call “basic justification theories.” I argue that given 1 the inference rules endorsed by basic justification theorists, we are a priori (propositionally) justified in believing that perception is reliable. This blocks the bootstrapping result.

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Easy Practical Knowledge.Timothy Kearl & J. Adam Carter - 2024 - Journal of Philosophy.

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