Suppositional Reasoning and Perceptual Justification

Logos and Episteme 7 (2):215-219 (2016)
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Abstract

James Van Cleve raises some objections to my attempt to solve the bootstrapping problem for what I call “basic justification theories.” I argue that given 1 the inference rules endorsed by basic justification theorists, we are a priori (propositionally) justified in believing that perception is reliable. This blocks the bootstrapping result.

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Citations of this work

Easy Practical Knowledge.Timothy Kearl & J. Adam Carter - forthcoming - Journal of Philosophy.

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References found in this work

The Scientist Qua Scientist Makes Value Judgments.Richard Rudner - 1953 - Philosophy of Science 20 (1):1-6.
In defence of the value free ideal.Gregor Betz - 2013 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 3 (2):207-220.
Values in science.Ernan McMullin - 2012 - Zygon 47 (4):686-709.

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