Clarendon Press (1977)

Abstract
The book was planned and written as a single, sustained argument. But earlier versions of a few parts of it have appeared separately. The object of this book is both to establish the existence of the paradoxes, and also to describe a non-Pascalian concept of probability in terms of which one can analyse the structure of forensic proof without giving rise to such typical signs of theoretical misfit. Neither the complementational principle for negation nor the multiplicative principle for conjunction applies to the central core of any forensic proof in the Anglo-American legal system. There are four parts included in this book. Accordingly, these parts have been written in such a way that they may be read in different orders by different kinds of reader.
Keywords Evidence (Law  Probabilities  Law Philosophy
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Call number K2261.C63
ISBN(s) 0198244126   9780198244127
DOI 10.2307/2219193
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Belief, Credence, and Norms.Lara Buchak - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (2):1-27.
Can Human Irrationality Be Experimentally Demonstrated?L. Jonathan Cohen - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):317-370.
Explanatory Coherence (Plus Commentary).Paul Thagard - 1989 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 12 (3):435-467.

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