Synthese 198 (11):11065-11080 (2020)

Michael Cohen
Stanford University
The problem of perception is the problem of explaining how perceptual knowledge is possible. The skeptic has a simple solution: it is not possible. I analyze the weaknesses of one type of skeptical reasoning by making explicit a dynamic epistemic principle from dynamic epistemic logic that is implicitly used in debating the problem, with the aim of offering a novel diagnosis to this skeptical argument. I argue that prominent modest foundationalist responses to perceptual skepticism can be understood as rejecting the dynamic assumption made by the skeptic, that there are independent reasons to doubt the truth of such a principle in the context of skeptical reasoning, and that making the dynamic principle explicit allows for a better understanding of at least one objection to modest foundationalism.
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-020-02772-3
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References found in this work BETA

Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
The Skeptic and the Dogmatist.James Pryor - 2000 - Noûs 34 (4):517–549.
Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 64 (1):200-201.
Mind and World.Huw Price & John McDowell - 1994 - Philosophical Books 38 (3):169-181.
What's Wrong with Moore's Argument?James Pryor - 2004 - Philosophical Issues 14 (1):349–378.

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Citations of this work BETA

Opaque Updates.Michael Cohen - 2021 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 50 (3):447-470.

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