Analysis 67 (2):162–166 (2007)
Authors |
|
Abstract |
It can happen that a single surface S, viewed in normal conditions, looks pure blue (“true blue”) to observer John but looks blue tinged with green to a second observer, Jane, even though both are normal in the sense that they pass the standard psychophysical tests for color vision. Tye (2006a) finds this situation prima facie puzzling, and then offers two different “solutions” to the puzzle.1 The first is that at least one observer misrepresents S’s color because, though normal in the sense explained, she is not a Normal color observer: her color detection system is not operating in the current condition in the way that Mother Nature intended it to operate. His second solution involves the idea that Mother Nature designed our color detection systems to be reliable with respect to the detection of coarse-grained colors (e.g., blue, green, yellow, orange), but our capacity to represent the fine-grained colors (e.g., true blue, blue tinged with green) is an undesigned spandrel. On this second solution, it is consistent with the variation between John and Jane that both represent the color of S in a way that complies with Mother Nature’s intentions: both represent S as exemplifying the coarse-grained color blue, and since (we may assume) S is in fact blue, both represent it veridically. Of course, they also represent fine-grained colors of S, and, according to Tye, at most one of these representations is veridical (Tye says that only God knows which). But at the level of representation for which Mother Nature designed our color detection systems, both John and Jane (qua Normal observers) are reliable detectors
|
Keywords | color perceptual variation |
Categories | (categorize this paper) |
DOI | 10.1111/j.1467-8284.2007.00668.x |
Options |
![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
Download options
References found in this work BETA
Citations of this work BETA
In Defense of Incompatibility, Objectivism, and Veridicality About Color.Pendaran Roberts & Kelly Schmidtke - 2012 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (4):547-558.
Tye-Dyed Teleology and the Inverted Spectrum.Jason Ford - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 156 (2):267-281.
Editorial for Minds and Machines Special Issue on Philosophy of Colour.M. Chirimuuta - 2015 - Minds and Machines 25 (2):123-132.
View all 6 citations / Add more citations
Similar books and articles
Asymmetries in the Distribution of Composite and Derived Basic Color Categories.Paul Kay - 1999 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (6):957-958.
Analytics
Added to PP index
2009-01-28
Total views
168 ( #56,816 of 2,409,610 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
2 ( #347,486 of 2,409,610 )
2009-01-28
Total views
168 ( #56,816 of 2,409,610 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
2 ( #347,486 of 2,409,610 )
How can I increase my downloads?
Downloads