The Two-Stage Model of Emotion and the Interpretive Structure of the Mind

Journal of Mind and Behavior 29 (4):291-320 (2008)
Abstract
Empirical evidence shows that non-conscious appraisal processes generate bodily responses to the environment. This finding is consistent with William James’s account of emotion, and it suggests that a general theory of emotion should follow James: a general theory should begin with the observation that physiological and behavioral responses precede our emotional experience. But I advance three arguments (empirical and conceptual arguments) showing that James’s further account of emotion as the experience of bodily responses is inadequate. I offer an alternative model, according to which responses (physical states) are perceived and interpreted by a separate cognitive process, one that assigns meaning to those responses. The non-conscious appraisal process and the interpretive process are distinct, hence a two-stage model of emotion. This model is related to Schachter and Singer’s two-factor theory. Their often-discussed experiment showed that interpretation can play a role in producing emotions. But they do not show that interpretation is necessary for producing emotions in general, outside of the experimental conditions that generated unexplained arousal in subjects. My two-stage model supports this stronger claim by situating the interpretive process in a comprehensive model of emotion.
Keywords theories of emotion  William James
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history
Request removal from index
Download options
Our Archive
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Did Descartes Have a Jamesian Theory of the Emotions?Gary Hatfield - 2007 - Philosophical Psychology 20 (4):413-440.
Gestalt Psychology and the Philosophy of Mind.William Epstein & Gary Hatfield - 1994 - Philosophical Psychology 7 (2):163-181.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
William James on Emotion and Intentionality.Matthew Ratcliffe - 2005 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 13 (2):179-202.
William James and the Psychology of Emotions: From 1884 to the Present.Joseph T. Palencik - 2007 - Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 43 (4):769 - 786.
The Causal Status of Emotions in Consciousness.Jason T. Ramsay & Marc D. Lewis - 2000 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (2):215-216.
Intellectual Emotions and Religious Emotions.Peter Goldie - 2011 - Faith and Philosophy 28 (1):93-101.
Emotion Experience and its Varieties.Nico H. Frijda - 2009 - Emotion Review 1 (3):264-271.
The Conceptual Framework for the Investigation of Emotions.P. M. S. Hacker - 2009 - In Ylva Gustafsson, Camilla Kronqvist & Michael McEachrane (eds.), Emotions and Understanding: Wittgensteinian Perspectives. Palgrave-Macmillan.
The Conceptual Framework for the Investigation of the Emotions.Peter M. S. Hacker - 2004 - International Review of Psychiatry 16 (3):199-208.

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2011-08-16

Total downloads

209 ( #19,145 of 2,172,657 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

8 ( #36,430 of 2,172,657 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.

Other forums