Williamson on Gettier Cases and Epistemic Logic

Abstract

Timothy Williamson has fruitfully exploited formal resources to shed considerable light on the nature of knowledge. In the paper under examination, Williamson turns his attention to Gettier cases, showing how they can be motivated formally. At the same time, he disparages the kind of justification he thinks gives rise to these cases. He favors instead his own notion of justification for which Gettier cases cannot arise. We take issue both with his disparagement of the kind of justification that figures in Gettier cases and the specifics of the formal motivation.

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Author's Profile

Juan Comesaña
University of Arizona

References found in this work

Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
Very Improbable Knowing.Timothy Williamson - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (5):971-999.
Theorizing About the Epistemic.Stewart Cohen - 2016 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 59 (7-8):839-857.
Improbable Knowing.Timothy Williamson - 2011 - In T. Dougherty (ed.), Evidentialism and its Discontents. Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work

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