Authors
Juan Comesaña
University of Arizona
Abstract
Timothy Williamson has fruitfully exploited formal resources to shed considerable light on the nature of knowledge. In the paper under examination, Williamson turns his attention to Gettier cases, showing how they can be motivated formally. At the same time, he disparages the kind of justification he thinks gives rise to these cases. He favors instead his own notion of justification for which Gettier cases cannot arise. We take issue both with his disparagement of the kind of justification that figures in Gettier cases and the specifics of the formal motivation.
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DOI 10.1080/0020174X.2013.775012
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References found in this work BETA

Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
Very Improbable Knowing.Timothy Williamson - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (5):971-999.
Theorizing About the Epistemic.Stewart Cohen - 2016 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 59 (7-8):839-857.
Improbable Knowing.Timothy Williamson - 2011 - In T. Dougherty (ed.), Evidentialism and its Discontents. Oxford University Press.

View all 11 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Belief is Weak.John Hawthorne, Daniel Rothschild & Levi Spectre - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (5):1393-1404.
Abominable KK Failures.Kevin Dorst - 2019 - Mind 128 (512):1227-1259.
The normality of error.Sam Carter & Simon Goldstein - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (8):2509-2533.
Higher-Order Evidence.Kevin Dorst - forthcoming - In Maria Lasonen-Aarnio & Clayton Littlejohn (eds.), The Routledge Handbook for the Philosophy of Evidence. Routledge.

View all 28 citations / Add more citations

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