Why the Intellect Cannot Have a Bodily Organ: De Anima 3.4
Phronesis 58 (4):347-377 (2013)
Abstract
I reconstruct Aristotle’s reasons for thinking that the intellect cannot have a bodily organ. I present Aristotle’s account of the aboutness or intentionality of cognitive states, both perceptual and intellectual. On my interpretation, Aristotle’s account is based around the notion of cognitive powers taking on forms in a special preservative way. Based on this account, Aristotle argues that no physical structure could enable a bodily part or combination of bodily parts to produce or determine the full range of forms that the human intellect can understand. For Aristotle, cognitive powers with bodily organs are always spatiotemporally limited, but the understanding is not. Aristotle claims that our understanding applies to all instances of the thing understood wherever and whenever they exist. On Aristotle’s own account the intellect in its nature is only “potential,” it does not actually possess any form. Thus nothing prevents it from possessing all forms.Author's Profile
DOI
10.1163/15685284-12341253
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Citations of this work
When and Why Understanding Needs Phantasmata: A Moderate Interpretation of Aristotle’s De Memoria and De Anima on the Role of Images in Intellectual Activities.Caleb Cohoe - 2016 - Phronesis: A Journal for Ancient Philosophy 61 (3):337-372.
A Monistic Conclusion to Aristotle’s Ergon Argument: the Human Good as the Best Achievement of a Human.Samuel H. Baker - 2021 - Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 103 (3):373-403.
Living without a Soul: Why God and the Heavenly Movers Fall Outside of Aristotle’s Psychology.Caleb Cohoe - 2020 - Phronesis 65 (3):281-323.
References found in this work
Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind.John R. Searle - 1983 - Cambridge University Press.