Dispositions, Character, and the Value of Acts

In Christian Miller, R. Michael Furr, Angela Knobel & William Fleeson (eds.), Character: New Directions from Philosophy, Psychology, and Theology. Oxford University Press. pp. 233-250 (2015)

Authors
Bradford Cokelet
University of Kansas
Abstract
This paper concerns the central virtue ethical thesis that the ethical quality of an agent's actions is a function of her dispositional character. Skeptics have rightly urged us to distinguish between an agent's particular intentions or occurrant motives and dispositional facts about her character, but they falsely contend that if we are attentive to this distinction, then we will see that the virtue ethical thesis is false. In this paper I present a new interpretation and defense of the virtue ethical thesis and show how to rebuff the skeptical attacks advanced by Thomas Hurka, Julia Markovits, and Roger Crisp. The key, I contend, is for virtue ethicists to adopt an embodied value conception of character instead of the aretaic trait conception suggested by Aristotle.
Keywords Dispositions  Character  Virtue Ethics
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Creditworthiness and Matching Principles.Jonathan Way - forthcoming - In Mark Timmons (ed.), Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, Vol 7. Oxford University Press.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Skepticism About Character Traits.Gilbert Harman - 2009 - The Journal of Ethics 13 (2-3):235 - 242.
Character, Reliability and Virtue Epistemology.Jason Baehr - 2006 - Philosophical Quarterly 56 (223):193–212.
The Possibility of Virtue.Miguel Alzola - 2012 - Business Ethics Quarterly 22 (2):377-404.
Two Cheers for Virtue: Or, Might Virtue Be Habit Forming?Peter Railton - 2011 - Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics 1:295-330.
Cultivating Virtue.Jonathan Webber - 2013 - In Havi Carel & Darian Meacham (eds.), Phenomenology and Naturalism: Examining the Relationship Between Human Experience and Nature. Cambridge University Press. pp. 239-259.
Harman Vs. Virtue Theory.Chris Tucker - 2004 - Southwest Philosophy Review 21 (1):137-145.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2014-10-13

Total views
321 ( #17,971 of 2,266,543 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
52 ( #14,723 of 2,266,543 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature