Synthese 88 (September):399-417 (1991)
Abstract |
Considerations of personal identity bear on John Searle's Chinese Room argument, and on the opposed position that a computer itself could really understand a natural language. In this paper I develop the notion of a virtual person, modelled on the concept of virtual machines familiar in computer science. I show how Searle's argument, and J. Maloney's attempt to defend it, fail. I conclude that Searle is correct in holding that no digital machine could understand language, but wrong in holding that artificial minds are impossible: minds and persons are not the same as the machines, biological or electronic, that realize them.
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Keywords | Artificial Intelligence Metaphysics Mind Personal Identity Searle, J |
Categories | (categorize this paper) |
DOI | 10.1007/BF00413555 |
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References found in this work BETA
On the Proper Treatment of Connectionism.Paul Smolensky - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (1):1-23.
Survival and Identity.David K. Lewis - 1976 - In Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (ed.), The Identities of Persons. University of California Press. pp. 17-40.
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Citations of this work BETA
Extended mind, functionalism and personal identity.Miljana Milojevic - 2020 - Synthese 197 (5):2143-2170.
Turing Test: 50 Years Later. [REVIEW]Ayse P. Saygin, Ilyas Cicekli & Varol Akman - 2000 - Minds and Machines 10 (4):463-518.
Yes, She Was!: Reply to Ford’s “Helen Keller Was Never in a Chinese Room”.William J. Rapaport - 2011 - Minds and Machines 21 (1):3-17.
View all 14 citations / Add more citations
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