Bodily Feeling in Depersonalization: A Phenomenological Account
Emotion Review 4 (2):145-150 (2012)
Abstract
This paper addresses the phenomenology of bodily feeling in depersonalization disorder. We argue that not all bodily feelings are intentional states that have the body or part of it as their object. We distinguish three broad categories of bodily feeling: noematic feeling, noetic feeling, and existential feeling. Then we show how an appreciation of the differences between them can contribute to an understanding of the depersonalization experienceAuthor Profiles
DOI
10.1177/1754073911430131
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Citations of this work
When the Window Cracks: Transparency and the Fractured Self in Depersonalisation.Anna Ciaunica, Jane Charlton & Harry Farmer - 2021 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 20 (1):1-19.
Losing Ourselves: Active Inference, Depersonalization, and Meditation.George Deane, Mark Miller & Sam Wilkinson - 2020 - Frontiers in Psychology 11.
Emotion and the Unreal Self: Depersonalization Disorder and De-Affectualization.Nick Medford - 2012 - Emotion Review 4 (2):139-144.
Bodily feelings and felt inclinations.Rowland Stout - 2022 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 21 (2):277-292.
References found in this work
The Phenomenological Mind: An Introduction to Philosophy of Mind and Cognitive Science.Shaun Gallagher & Dan Zahavi - 2007 - Routledge.
Feelings of Being: Phenomenology, Psychiatry and the Sense of Reality.Matthew Ratcliffe (ed.) - 2008 - Oxford University Press.
