Baconian Probability and Hume’s Theory of Testimony

Hume Studies 27 (2):195-226 (2001)

The foremost advocate of Baconian probability, L. J. Cohen, has credited Hume for being the first to explicitly recognize that there is an important kind of probability which does not fit into the framework afforded by the calculus of chance, a recognition that is evident in Hume's distinction between analogical probability and probabilities arising from chance or cause. This essay defends Hume's account of the credibility of testimony, including his notorious argument against the credibility of testimony to miracles, in light of this insight
Keywords Hume  testimony  probability
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DOI hume200127210
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