Philosophia:1-8 (forthcoming)

Juan Colomina-Alminana
University of Texas at Austin
, 3661–3678, 2020) argues that a positivistic defense of science’s objectivity is incoherent because bias in the generation of scientific theories (implies that the rational evaluation of theories will also be biased. Even though this is an idea easy to agree with, this approach is flawed for two different but related reasons. First, Dellsén’s notion of bias does not account for many ordinary biases. Second, Dellsén’s use of bias at the community-level is inconsistent. It shifts from individual scientists generating new theories and making decisions to scientific communities evaluating and accepting what theories are valid. This article offers a stronger response than Dellsén’s about aseptic objectivity in science by providing a more adequate account of bias, where psychological and behavioral aspects of individual scientists and community-level scientific practices are considered.
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DOI 10.1007/s11406-021-00366-y
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Scientific Perspectivism.Ronald N. Giere - 2006 - University of Chicago Press.
The Emotive Theory of Ethics.J. O. Urmson - 1968 - London: Hutchinson.

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