In John Collins, Ned Hall & Laurie Paul (eds.), Causation and Counterfactuals. MIT Press. pp. 1--57 (2004)

Authors
L. A. Paul
Yale University
Abstract
Among the many philosophers who hold that causal facts1 are to be explained in terms of—or more ambitiously, shown to reduce to—facts about what happens, together with facts about the fundamental laws that govern what happens, the clear favorite is an approach that sees counterfactual dependence as the key to such explanation or reduction. The paradigm examples of causation, so advocates of this approach tell us, are examples in which events c and e— the cause and its effect— both occur, but: had c not occurred, e would not have occurred either. From this starting point ideas proliferate in a vast profusion. But the remarkable disparity among these ideas should not obscure their common foundation. Neither should the diversity of opinion about the prospects for a philosophical analysis of causation obscure their importance. For even those philosophers who see these prospects as dim—perhaps because they suffer post-Quinean queasiness at the thought of any analysis of any concept of interest—can often be heard to say such things as that causal relations among events are somehow “a matter of” the patterns of counterfactual dependence to be found in them.
Keywords Causation  Counterfactuals
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References found in this work BETA

Two Concepts of Causation.Ned Hall - 2004 - In John Collins, Ned Hall & Laurie Paul (eds.), Causation and Counterfactuals. MIT Press. pp. 225-276.
Causation and the Price of Transitivity.Ned Hall - 2000 - Journal of Philosophy 97 (4):198.
Preemptive Prevention.John Collins - 2000 - Journal of Philosophy 97 (4):223-234.

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Citations of this work BETA

Metaphysical Causation.Alastair Wilson - 2018 - Noûs 52 (4):723-751.
Omission Impossible.Sara Bernstein - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (10):2575-2589.
Intuition Fail: Philosophical Activity and the Limits of Expertise.Wesley Buckwalter - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (2):378-410.
The Metaphysics of Causation.Jonathan Schaffer - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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