Journal of Speculative Philosophy 25 (2):161-173 (2011)
AbstractThe most effective—indeed, the only—way to make the future different from the past is, in the judgment of pragmatists such as William James, John Dewey, and George Herbert Mead, to remake the present. As Dewey notes, "present activity" is the only phase of human conduct really under our control (MW 14.184). 1 For just this reason, we must be mindful of the past and solicitous about the future as well as attuned to the present: "Memory of the past, observation of the present, foresight of the future are indispensable. But they are indispensable to a present liberation, an enriching growth of action" unfolding in the here and now (MW 14.182). 2 Dewey goes so far as to assert: "We do not use the ..
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Reparative agency and commitment in William James’ pragmatism.Bonnie Sheehey - 2022 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 30 (5):818-836.
References found in this work
The Will to Believe: And Other Essays in Popular Philosophy.William James - 1979 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
The Will to Believe, and other Essays in Popular Philosophy.William James - 1897 - Philosophical Review 6 (3):331.
Essays in Radical Empiricism.B. H. Bode, William James & R. B. Perry - 1912 - Philosophical Review 21 (6):704.
A Pluralistic Universe.William James - 1980 - Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 16 (1):73-81.