Delusions and misbeliefs

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (6):517-517 (2009)
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Abstract

Beliefs may be true or false, and grounded or ungrounded. McKay & Dennett (M&D) treat these properties of belief as independent. What, then, do they mean by misbelief? They state that misbeliefs are So would they consider a very well-grounded belief that is false a misbelief? And why can't beliefs that are very poorly grounded be considered delusions, even when they are true?

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Delusional Inference.Ryan McKay - 2012 - Mind and Language 27 (3):330-355.

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