Desire-as-Belief Implies Opinionation or Indifference

Analysis 55 (1):2 - 5 (1995)
Abstract
Rationalizations of deliberation often make reference to two kinds of mental state, which we call belief and desire. It is worth asking whether these kinds are necessarily distinct, or whether it might be possible to construe desire as belief of a certain sort — belief, say, about what would be good. An expected value theory formalizes our notions of belief and desire, treating each as a matter of degree. In this context the thesis that desire is belief might amount to the claim that the degree to which an agent desires any proposition A equals the degree to which the agent believes the proposition that A would be good. We shall write this latter proposition ‘A◦’ (pronounced ‘A halo’). The Desire-as-Belief Thesis states, then, that to each proposition A there corresponds another proposition A◦, where the probability of A◦ equals the expected value of A.
Keywords Axiom  Belief  Decision Theory  Desire  Logic  Model  Probability  Value Theory
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.2307/3328612
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history
Request removal from index
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 28,191
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Nonbelief and the Desire-as-Belief Thesis.Charles B. Cross - 2008 - Acta Analytica 23 (2):115-124.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Nonbelief and the Desire-as-Belief Thesis.Charles B. Cross - 2008 - Acta Analytica 23 (2):115-124.
Desire Beyond Belief.Alan Hájek & Philip Pettit - 2004 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (1):77-92.
A Moorean Paradox of Desire.David Wall - 2012 - Philosophical Explorations 15 (1):63-84.
Backgrounding Desire.Philip Pettit & Michael Smith - 1990 - Philosophical Review 99 (4):565-592.
A Dialogue Model of Belief.Douglas Walton - 2011 - Argument and Computation 1 (1):23-46.

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2009-01-28

Total downloads

187 ( #23,897 of 2,172,658 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

1 ( #325,028 of 2,172,658 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.

Other forums