Defeasible reasoning and logic programming

Minds and Machines 1 (4):417-436 (1991)

Abstract
The general conditions of epistemic defeat are naturally represented through the interplay of two distinct kinds of entailment, deductive and defeasible. Many of the current approaches to modeling defeasible reasoning seek to define defeasible entailment via model-theoretic notions like truth and satisfiability, which, I argue, fails to capture this fundamental distinction between truthpreserving and justification-preserving entailments. I present an alternative account of defeasible entailment and show how logic programming offers a paradigm in which the distinction can be captured, allowing for the modeling of a larger range of types of defeat. This is possible through a natural extension of the declarative and procedural semantics of Horn clauses
Keywords Defeasible reasoning  entailment  justification  logic programming
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DOI 10.1007/BF00352918
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References found in this work BETA

Theory of Knowledge.Roderick M. Chisholm - 1966 - Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall.
Defeasible Reasoning.John L. Pollock - 1987 - Cognitive Science 11 (4):481-518.
Knowledge and Justification.John Pollock - 1974 - Princeton University Press.
Circumscription — A Form of Non-Monotonic Reasoning.John McCarthy - 1980 - Artificial Intelligence 13:27–39.
Semantic Considerations on Nonmonotonic Logic.Robert C. Moore - 1985 - Artificial Intelligence 25:75-94.

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