Evolutionary naturalism and the objectivity of morality

Biology and Philosophy 8 (1):47-60 (1993)
Abstract
We propose an objective and justifiable ethics that is contingent on the truth of evolutionary theory. We do not argue for the truth of this position, which depends on the empirical question of whether moral functions form a natural class, but for its cogency and possibility. The position we propose combines the advantages of Kantian objectivity with the explanatory and motivational advantages of moral naturalism. It avoids problems with the epistemological inaccessibility of transcendent values, while avoiding the relativism or subjectivism often associated with moral naturalism. Our position emerges out of criticisms of the contemporary sociobiological views of morality found in the writings of Richard Alexander, Michael Ruse, and Robert Richards.
Keywords Ethics  morality  naturalism  sociobiology
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/BF00868505
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Revision history
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 30,122
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
A Theory of Justice.John Rawls - 2009 - In Steven M. Cahn (ed.), Philosophy and Rhetoric. Oxford University Press. pp. 133-135.
Moral Realism.Peter Railton - 1986 - Philosophical Review 95 (2):163-207.

View all 19 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Evolutionary Moral Realism.John Collier & Michael Stingl - 2013 - Biological Theory 7 (3):218-226.
Naturalisms in Philosophy of Mind.Steven Horst - 2009 - Philosophy Compass 4 (1):219-254.
Can Biology Make Ethics Objective?Richmond Campbell - 1996 - Biology and Philosophy 11 (1):21-31.

View all 9 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total downloads
62 ( #86,944 of 2,191,400 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
7 ( #27,587 of 2,191,400 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature