Extended Rationality: A Hinge Epistemology

Palgrave-Macmillan (2015)

Authors
Annalisa Coliva
University of California, Irvine
Abstract
Extended Rationality: A Hinge Epistemology provides a novel account of the structure of epistemic justification. Its central claim builds upon Wittgenstein's idea in On Certainty that epistemic justifications hinge on some basic assumptions and that epistemic rationality extends to these very hinges. It exploits these ideas to address major problems in epistemology, such as the nature of perceptual justifications, external world skepticism, epistemic relativism, the epistemic status of basic logical laws, of the Principle of the Uniformity of Nature, of our belief in the existence of the past and of other minds, and the nature of testimonial justification. Along the way, further technical issues, such as the scope of the Principle of Closure of epistemic operators under known entailment, the notion of transmission failure, and the existence of entitlements are addressed in new and illuminating ways.
Keywords perceptual warrant  epistemic rationality  epistemic relativism  external world skepticism
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Epistemic Relativism, Scepticism, Pluralism.Martin Kusch - 2017 - Synthese 194 (12):4687-4703.
Inquiry And The Transmission Of Knowledge.Christoph Kelp - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (2):298-310.
What Do Philosophers Do? Maddy, Moore and Wittgenstein.Annalisa Coliva - 2018 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 8 (3):198-207.

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