Synthese 82 (2):207-22 (1990)
Abstract |
Functionalism, a philosophical theory, has empirical consequences. Functionalism predicts that where systematic transformations of sensory input occur and are followed by behavioral accommodation in which normal function of the organism is restored such that the causes and effects of the subject's psychological states return to those of the period prior to the transformation, there will be a return of qualia or subjective experiences to those present prior to the transform. A transformation of this type that has long been of philosophical interest is the possibility of an inverted spectrum. Hilary Putnam argues that the physical possibility of acquired spectrum inversion refutes functionalism. I argue, however, that in the absence of empirical results no a priori arguments against functionalism, such as Putnam's, can be cogent. I sketch an experimental situation which would produce acquired spectrum inversion. The mere existence of qualia inversion would constitute no refutation of functionalism; only its persistence after behavioral accommodation to the inversion would properly count against functionalism. The cumulative empirical evidence from experiments on image inversion suggests that the results of actual spectrum inversion would confirm rather than refute functionalism
|
Keywords | Epistemology Functionalism Inversion Spectrum Problem Putnam, H |
Categories | (categorize this paper) |
DOI | 10.1007/BF00413662 |
Options |
![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
Download options
References found in this work BETA
Mad Pain and Martian Pain.David Lewis - 1980 - In Ned Block (ed.), Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology. Harvard University Press. pp. 216-222.
The Senses Considered as Perceptual Systems.James Jerome Gibson - 1966 - Boston, USA: Houghton Mifflin.
What Psychological States Are Not.Ned Block & Jerry A. Fodor - 1972 - Philosophical Review 81 (April):159-81.
View all 18 references / Add more references
Citations of this work BETA
A Sensorimotor Account of Vision and Visual Consciousness.J. Kevin O’Regan & Alva Noë - 2001 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (5):883-917.
Neural Plasticity and Consciousness.Susan Hurley & Alva Noë - 2003 - Biology and Philosophy 18 (1):131-168.
Is Trilled Smell Possible? How the Structure of Olfaction Determines the Phenomenology of Smell.Ed Cooke & Erik Myin - 2011 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 18 (11-12):59-95.
View all 16 citations / Add more citations
Similar books and articles
Spectrum Inversion and the Color Solid.Austen Clark - 1985 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 23 (4):431-43.
Spectrum Inversion Without a Difference in Representation is Impossible.Jeff Speaks - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 156 (3):339-361.
Hoffman’s “Proof” of the Possibility of Spectrum Inversion.Alex Byrne & David Hilbert - 2006 - Consciousness and Cognition 15 (1):48-50.
Asymmetry Among Hering Primaries Thwarts the Inverted Spectrum Argument.Robert E. MacLaury - 1999 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (6):960-961.
Functionalism, Qualia, and the Inverted Spectrum.Terence Horgan - 1984 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 44 (June):453-69.
Analytics
Added to PP index
2009-01-28
Total views
171 ( #69,659 of 2,519,621 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
3 ( #205,383 of 2,519,621 )
2009-01-28
Total views
171 ( #69,659 of 2,519,621 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
3 ( #205,383 of 2,519,621 )
How can I increase my downloads?
Downloads