Fictionalism in the philosophy of mathematics

In E. J. Craig (ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2011)

Authors
Mark Colyvan
University of Sydney
Abstract
Fictionalism in the philosophy of mathematics is the view that mathematical statements, such as ‘8+5=13’ and ‘π is irrational’, are to be interpreted at face value and, thus interpreted, are false. Fictionalists are typically driven to reject the truth of such mathematical statements because these statements imply the existence of mathematical entities, and according to fictionalists there are no such entities. Fictionalism is a nominalist (or anti-realist) account of mathematics in that it denies the existence of a realm of abstract mathematical entities. It should be contrasted with mathematical realism (or Platonism) where mathematical statements are taken to be true, and, moreover, are taken to be truths about mathematical entities. Fictionalism should also be contrasted with other nominalist philosophical accounts of mathematics that propose a reinterpretation of mathematical statements, according to which the statements in question are true but no longer about mathematical entities. Fictionalism is thus an error theory of mathematical discourse: at face value mathematical discourse commits us to mathematical entities and although we normally take many of the statements of this discourse to be true, in doing so we are in error (cf. error theories in ethics).
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Deflating Existential Consequence: A Case for Nominalism.Jody Azzouni - 2004 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 10 (4):573-577.
How Nominalist is Hartry Field's Nominalism?Michael D. Resnik - 1985 - Philosophical Studies 47 (2):163 - 181.

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