Hume Studies 25 (1 and 2):155-170 (1999)

Mark Collier
University of Minnesota, Morris
In Book I, part iv, section 2 of the Treatise, "Of scepticism with regard to the senses," Hume presents two different answers to the question of how we come to believe in the continued existence of unperceived objects. He rejects his first answer shortly after its formulation, and the remainder of the section articulates an alternative account of the development of the belief. The account that Hume adopts, however, is susceptible to a number of insurmountable objections, which motivates a reassessment of his original proposal. This paper defends a version of Hume's initial explanation of the belief in continued existence and examines some of its philosophical implications.
Keywords hume  cognitive science  object permanence
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ISBN(s) 0319-7336
DOI hume1999251/24
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References found in this work BETA

.David Bates (ed.) - 2007 - Palgrave-Macmillan.
.J. L. McClelland & D. E. Rumelhart (eds.) - 1987 - MIT Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Hume and the Enactive Approach to Mind.Tom Froese - 2009 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (1):95-133.
Hume's Legacy: A Cognitive Science Perspective.Mark Collier - 2018 - In Angela Coventry & Alex Sager (eds.), The Humean Mind. Routledge. pp. 434-445.
The Distinction Between Coherence and Constancy in Hume's Treatise I.Iv.2.Tim Black - 2007 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 15 (1):1-25.
Reading Hume's Inference From Constancy From the Vulgar Standpoint.Kien-How Goh - 2012 - Journal of Scottish Philosophy 10 (2):237-253.

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