Philosophia Mathematica 26 (1):136-148 (2018)

Julian Cole
Buffalo State College
© The Authors [2017]. Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.comGila Sher believes that our basic epistemic situation — that we aim to gain knowledge of a highly complex world using our severely limited, yet highly resourceful, cognitive capacities — demands that all epistemic projects be undertaken within two broad constraints: epistemic freedom and epistemic friction. The former permits us to employ our cognitive resourcefulness fully while undertaking epistemic projects, while the latter requires that such projects always be substantially grounded in both the mind and reality. Epistemic Friction is an exploration of the latter constraint — the former being left for later work — that demonstrates the complementary nature of three projects that Sher has been working on, largely independently of one another, over the past three decades: a dynamic, neo-Quinean model of knowledge, a substantivist theory of truth, and...
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DOI 10.1093/philmat/nkx033
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References found in this work BETA

Two Dogmas of Empiricism.Willard V. O. Quine - 1951 - Philosophical Review 60 (1):20–43.
Two Dogmas of Empiricism.W. V. O. Quine - 1951 - [Longmans, Green].

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