Heuristics, justification, and defeasible reasoning

Minds and Machines 5 (4):467-487 (1995)
Heuristics can be regarded as justifying the actions and beliefs of problem-solving agents. I use an analysis of heuristics to argue that a symbiotic relationship exists between traditional epistemology and contemporary artificial intelligence. On one hand, the study of models of problem-solving agents usingquantitative heuristics, for example computer programs, can reveal insight into the understanding of human patterns of epistemic justification by evaluating these models'' performance against human problem-solving. On the other hand,qualitative heuristics embody the justifying ability of defeasible rules, the understanding of which is provided by traditional epistemology.
Keywords Heuristics  epistemology  problem-solving  justification  defeasible reasoning
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/BF00974978
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 24,470
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Roderick M. Chisholm (1966). Theory of Knowledge. Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall.
John Pollock (1987). Defeasible Reasoning. Cognitive Science 11 (4):481-518.
Ray Reiter (1980). A Logic for Default Reasoning. Artificial Intelligence 13:81-137.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

23 ( #205,889 of 1,925,574 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

2 ( #308,518 of 1,925,574 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.