Hume's Legacy: A Cognitive Science Perspective

In Angela Coventry & Alex Sager (eds.), The Humean Mind. Routledge. pp. 434-445 (2018)

Authors
Mark Collier
University of Minnesota, Morris
Abstract
Hume is an experimental philosopher who attempts to understand why we think, feel, and act as we do. But how should we evaluate the adequacy of his proposals? This chapter examines Hume’s account from the perspective of interdisciplinary work in cognitive science.
Keywords Hume  Cognitive Science  Experimental Philosophy  Science of Human Nature
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