Naturalism and the paradox of revisability

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (1):1–11 (2006)
This paper examines the paradox of revisability. This paradox was proposed by Jerrold Katz as a problem for Quinean naturalised epistemology. Katz employs diagonalisation to demonstrate what he takes to be an inconsistency in the constitutive principles of Quine's epistemology. Specifically, the problem seems to rest with the principle of universal revisability which states that no statement is immune to revision. In this paper it is argued that although there is something odd about employing universal revisability to revise itself, there is nothing paradoxical about this. At least, there is no paradox along the lines suggested by Katz.
Keywords 440102 Epistemology  C1  780199 Other  Philosophy   Yablos Paradox
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2006.00244.x
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References found in this work BETA
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays.W. V. Quine - 1969 - Columbia University Press.
From a Logical Point of View.W. V. Quine - 1953 - Harvard University Press.
Pursuit of Truth.W. V. Quine - 1990 - Harvard University Press.
Paradox Without Self--Reference.Stephen Yablo - 1993 - Analysis 53 (4):251-252.

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Citations of this work BETA
Katz's Revisability Paradox Dissolved.Allard Tamminga & Sander Verhaegh - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (4):771-784.
A New Revisability Paradox.Daniel Y. Elstein - 2007 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88 (3):308–318.

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