Neural representationalism, the Hard Problem of Content and vitiated verdicts. A reply to Hutto & Myin

Abstract

Colombo’s (Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 2013) plea for neural representationalism is the focus of a recent contribution to Phenomenology and Cognitive Science by Daniel D. Hutto and Erik Myin. In that paper, Hutto and Myin have tried to show that my arguments fail badly. Here, I want to respond to their critique clarifying the type of neural representationalism put forward in my (Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 2013) piece, and to take the opportunity to make a few remarks of general interest concerning what Hutto and Myin have dubbed “the Hard Problem of Content.”

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2014-02-16

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Matteo Colombo
Tilburg University

Citations of this work

Neural Representations Observed.Eric Thomson & Gualtiero Piccinini - 2018 - Minds and Machines 28 (1):191-235.
Representation-Hunger Reconsidered.Jan Degenaar & Erik Myin - 2014 - Synthese 191 (15):3639-3648.
REC: Just Radical Enough.Erik Myin & Daniel D. Hutto - 2015 - Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric 41 (1):61-71.

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