Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (5):629-630 (2004)

Authors
John Collier
University of KwaZulu-Natal
Abstract
After distinguishing reductive explanability in principle from ontological deflation, I give a case of an obviously physical property that is reductively inexplicable in principle. I argue that biological systems often have this character, and that, if we make certain assumptions about the cohesion and dynamics of the mind and its physical substrate, then it is emergent according to Broad's criteria.
Keywords Mind
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Reprint years 2005
DOI 10.1017/s0140525x04240146
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