Philosophy 54 (209):390 - 394 (1979)

Abstract
Having distinguished essentially fictional characters from inessentially fictional ones and having identified Anna Karenina as an inessentially fictional character, Barrie Paskins solves the problem I posed in ‘How Can We Be Moved by the Fate of Anna Karenina?’ thus: ‘our pity towards the inessentially fictional is, or can without forcing be construed as, pity for those people if any who are in the same bind as the character in the fiction’. Making a similar point in a footnote, ‘our emotions towards fictional characters are directed towards those real people, if any, who are in essentially the same situation’, he continues in the text, ‘This possibility is neglected by Radford and Weston.’
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DOI 10.1017/S0031819100048804
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Ideal Presence: How Kames Solved the Problem of Fiction and Emotion.Eva Dadlez - 2011 - Journal of Scottish Philosophy 9 (1):115-133.
Replies to Three Critics.Colin Radford - 1989 - Philosophy 64 (247):93 - 97.
The Paradox (Es) of Pitying and Fearing Fictions.Jennifer Wilkinson - 2000 - South African Journal of Philosophy 19 (1):8-25.

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